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For the past few decades, and increasingly in the past few years, U.S.
state governments have supplemented federal immigration law with
state laws overtly designed to combat the perceived ills stemming from
undocumented immigration to the United States. Proponents of these
laws justify them on the basis of a normative negativity associated with
"illegal" immigration, and negative economic consequences for natives.
They further disclaim any discriminatory motive behind the laws,
claiming that the laws only target "illegal" immigration.
This note argues that (1) through a comparison with immigration
flows and laws arising in the First Era of Globalization in the late
1800s, these new laws represent a predictable nativist response to global
flows of labor migrants, and, though they are facially justified on
grounds of "illegality," such a justification overshadows a deeper
discriminatory justification, which anti-Chinese laws arising in the First
Era of Globalization made no pretense of veiling. Further, this note
argues that (2) these laws are normatively misguided, particularly in the
face of relentless globalizing processes that strengthen migration
incentives and the economic good which could be acquired through
reduced barriers to global labor migration.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two centuries, global migration patterns have ebbed
and flowed in response to changes in immigration control regimes,
domestic politics, and mobility in capital, trade, and labor. Immigration
control regimes have moved along similar lines, often reflecting racial,
cultural, and social animosity that an influx of dissimilar "others" can
create. Yet, the United States federal government first implemented
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immigration restrictions' with the Page Act of 1875.2 The federal
government later broadened such restrictions in 1880 through the
renegotiation of the Burlingame Treaty with China, which allowed the
United States to restrict Chinese immigration writ-large.3 A populist
backlash against these new and dissimilar immigrants4 led to the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which banned Chinese
immigration-squarely on the basis of race and nationality-for ten
years.5 Thus, for over one hundred years, immigration to the United
States was based on the global labor market, subject only to the most
lenient regulations.
The period from approximately 1880 until 1914, in which Congress
passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, is known as "The First Era of
Globalization."6 Before this period, approximately one hundred years
after the adoption of the Constitution, there were no federal
immigration regulations in the United States. There were, however,
various state7 and local immigration regulations that appeared during
this time-though the federal government often successfully challenged
1. The federal government did have some statutory authority to expel immigrants
prior to this time under the Alien and Sedition Acts. See An Act Concerning Aliens, 1 Stat.
570, 570-571 (1798) (giving the President the power to order departure of all aliens who, in
the President's discretion, were judged "dangerous to the peace and safety of the United
States" or whom the President suspected were conspiring against the government).
However, no broad classification of immigrants was excluded or deportable from the
United States before the Page Act of 1875.
2. ELTHNE LULBHELD, ENTRY DENIED: CONTROLLING SEXUALITY AT THE BORDER 31
(2002). The Page Act prohibited the immigration of convicts, prostitutes, and forced
laborers from Asia. The Page Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 477, 477-78. The prostitution provision
was heavily enforced, especially against Chinese women immigrants, while the others
were not. LULBHELD, supra, at 31. For further background on the Page Act and its effects,
see Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 643-47 (2005).
3. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (2006).
4. I use the same definition of "immigrant" here as does the U.S. Code: An immigrant
is a noncitizen of the United States, who intends to move to the United States to live and
work permanently. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2012). This definition is distinct from those
noncitizens in the United States who have legal authorization to remain in the country,
but for a definite period of time, subject to certain conditions. See 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(15)(A)-(V).
5. MOTOMURA, supra note 3, at 25.
6. Moritz Schularick & Thomas M. Steger, Financial Integration, Investment, and
Economic Growth: Evidence from Two Eras of Financial Globalization, 92 REV. EcON. &
STAT. 756, 757 (2010).
7. Unless otherwise indicated, "state" refers to one of the individual states of the
United States.
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these laws on various constitutional grounds.8 These state immigration
laws often reflected vicious racial, social, and cultural biases, which
emerged as a result of the increased migration that the empty American
interior necessitated, and that the First Era of Globalization
encouraged.
Today, the federal government has caught up to the states in its
regulation of immigration. A myriad of immigration laws fills Section
Eight of the United States Code, along with numerous executive
regulations. These laws have grown largely out of labor necessities,
family reunification desires, and humanitarian aspirations.
Nevertheless, an influx of racially, socially, and culturally disparate
peoples into any given political space still produces immigration laws
which reflect racial, social, and cultural animosities, whether stated
squarely on the face of the laws, or hidden within subtler justifications.
Federal immigration law has historically been no stranger to this trend.
Furthermore, states still perceive-sometimes in contravention of
reality-that the federal government is not regulating properly or
enough. In our current era of globalization, the subtle racially, socially,
and culturally biased laws have reemerged in the context of state
regulation of immigration. States have not justified recent restrictionist
laws reflecting these biases directly on these bases-such an overt
admission would be untenable politics and likely unconstitutional
today.9 Rather, the states justify the laws on the basis of immigrants'
"illegality," and the economic harm that immigrants supposedly do to
natives.10
Yet, these arguments prove specious. As this note will elaborate
upon later, unrestricted legal immigration into the United States would
no doubt still provoke equal dismay from immigration opponents. While
breaking the law can certainly be normatively "bad," a further
8. See, e.g., Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283 (1849) (striking down New
York and Massachusetts statutes that imposed a tax on foreigners leaving state ports as
violating the federal government's exclusive authority to control commerce between the
United States and foreign nations).
9. But see Dunn v. INS, 499 F.2d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying rational basis
review to a statute denying adjustment of status only to western hemisphere countries
including Mexico).
10. See, e.g., S.B. 1070, 2d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ariz. 2010) (codified at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 11-1051(A) (2012) (declaring an intent to "discourage and deter the unlawful entry and
presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United
States."); Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Laws
535, § 2 (finding that "illegal immigration is causing economic hardship and lawlessness
in the state"). To the extent that national restrictionist advocacy organizations have
influenced state legislators to pass such laws, see, e.g., Illegal Aliens Taking U.S. Jobs,
FED'N AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/issue/illegal-aliens-taking-u-s-jobs (last
visited June 25, 2013).
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justification is necessary to condemn "illegal" immigration;1' if the same
group of people migrated under laws that removed their illegality,
immigration opponents would still undoubtedly have misgivings.
Further, the literature on labor migration economics universally
suggests that pro-immigration policies invariably lead to economic
growth-both in sending and receiving countries and among natives and
new immigrants. Moreover, the pressures of unemployment and
depressed wages that immigration opponents often fear, have, at the
very least, been overstated.
So, what is really behind these laws? This note first argues that the
unique form of globalization that has been occurring for the past few
decades has served (1) to set the underlying conditions for increased
global labor migration, and (2) to inculcate nativist attitudes in the
United States to such a degree that economically driven and
evidence-based legislation has become difficult, if not impossible, in this
arena. This argument applies with particular force to the state
legislatures, which are more responsive to popular attitudes.
In this note, I strive to use these two eras of globalization-the First
Era and the Current Era-as lenses through which to view the
mechanisms, justifications, and ultimate effects of immigration
regulations that have arisen due to globalizing processes. Ultimately,
globalization does serve to increase native hostilities to foreign labor
migrants, due to perceived negative effects on native employment and
wage rates. In reality, however, the fullest exercise of
globalization-removing any barriers to labor migration-would have at
least a neutral effect on native employment and wage rates, and a
positive effect on migrant employment and wage rates. Nevertheless, as
a result of the perceived effects, state legislators have drawn up laws
that subtly discriminate on racial, social, and cultural norms-just as in
the First Era of Globalization. These laws reveal that, faced with
11. A further word on semantics: The term "illegal immigration" has been used for
decades by immigration opponents, politicians, and the media to describe mainly those
who come to the United States without any valid immigration status or visa. The term is
at once over- and under-inclusive. If the term means "violators of immigration law," the
popular conception does not necessarily encompass a Polish student who overstays her F
Visa or even a lawful permanent resident of forty years, who is rendered deportable for
possession of marijuana. Yet, it may also include illegal entrants, who have subsequently
acquired temporary protection or an interim status, and are now present lawfully. The
term also unfairly conflates criminality to such law violations, where the vast majority of
enforcement occurs in a civil context. However, the popular conception still prevails, and
since this work serves in part to respond to restrictionist -arguments, I will use the term.
Where I use it, it refers only to those who entered the United States without status, and
remain without status, or immigrants with expired status (i.e., the Polish student
mentioned above in this footnote).
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evidence for the positive effect of labor migrants on domestic economies,
state legislators may, alternatively, be experiencing information
asymmetry or cognitive dissonance, or basing their restrictionist laws
on racial, national, or cultural biases. But today, rather than justifying
these discriminatory laws on restricting an undesirable race, religion,
political affiliation, nationality, or culture,12 legislators justify the laws
on the basis of a migrant's "illegality." 3 Illegality, however, often gets
caught up in intractable ways with discriminatory racial, societal, and
cultural associations; moreover, these negative associations blend over
into fully "legal" immigrants. Thus, globalization pushes the same
results as in the past, but with a minor justificatory alteration in light
of modern political and legal realities.
First, this note will discuss globalization in general, seeking to lay
down a few key definitions-noting in particular the globalizing
processes of the First and Current Eras of Globalization. Thereafter,
this note will outline targeted immigration laws: first, focusing on those
arising just before and through the First Era of Globalization; then,
outlining the various state immigration regulations akin to Arizona's
S.B. 1070.14 Specifically, I will note the mechanisms, intended and
actual effects,15 and justifications of these laws. To critique these
justifications, the economics literature on globalized migration will be
examined, along with the notion of "illegality" as a justification for the
12. See, e.g., FAQ, FED'N AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/faq (last visited
Mar. 2, 2013) (disclaiming favoring immigration policies that discriminate "on the basis of
race, creed, color, religion, gender or nationality").
13. See Illegal Immigration, FAQ, FED'N AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/
issues/illegal-immigration (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). Note especially that, among various
issues in immigration policy, "illegal immigration" is the most highlighted issue on FAIR's
website.
14. There are many other important examples of state immigration regulations, many
of which are pro-immigrant. See Illinois DREAM Act, 2011 Ill. Legis. Serv. 97-233 (West)
(making scholarships, college savings, and prepaid tuition programs available for
undocumented immigrant students who graduate from Illinois high schools); A.B. 131,
2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (making in-state tuition available for undocumented
immigrants). Some reflect the biases mentioned in this paper, while others do not.
However, for ease of comparison and the public importance and notoriety of these laws,
this paper's focus is on SB 1070 and its copies in other states.
15. Many of these laws remain under preliminary and permanent injunctions as a
result of constitutional challenges by immigrants and the U.S. federal government. See
Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012); Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v.
Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012); Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Governor of
Alabama, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th
Cir. 2012); Friendly House v. Whiting, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (D. Ariz. 2012); Buquer v.
Indianapolis, 797 F. Supp. 2d 905 (S.D. Ind. 2011); United States v. South Carolina, 840 F.
Supp. 2d 898 (D.S.C. 2011). Thus, we may not know their actual effects for some time, if
ever.
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new laws, as well as a process of sociopolitical "illegalization." The note
will conclude with some normative thoughts on how to reframe our
political discussion of these issues to approach the reformation of what
many consider a "broken" immigration system from a more constructive
perspective.
I. GLOBALIZATION AND GLOBAL LABOR MIGRATION
Broadly defined, globalization is the increased integration of the
globe along a number of different axes.16 Materially, globalization
includes the economy, culture, and society at large.' 7 Much literature on
globalization discusses its economic aspects: indeed, though a wide
array of disagreement exists on globalization's effect on, and integration
with, the global economy-and even on its very existence as an
epistemological method for studying the global economy-all sides agree
that the world has seen greater global economic integration during this
current period of globalization.18
Yet, according to globalization scholars-and implicit in a common
understanding of the term-globalization has also had profound effects
on societal, cultural, political, and technological developments
worldwide.' 9 These effects, arguably, derive largely from the integration
of the global economy, because otherwise there would be less incentive
for these types of changes. Nevertheless, these noneconomic sectors are
critically important to globalization-both as an academic field of study
and to the common conception of the term.
A. Global Labor Migration
Global labor migration fits into the overarching globalization mold,
mixing with economic conceptions of globalization in critical ways, but
ultimately more publically perceived as social and cultural aspects of
the concept. Globalization is (1) a driver of immigration, through a
couple of mechanisms that will be discussed later, (2) an external
concept for natives impacted by global labor migration, and finally, (3) a
tool for comparing laws and other responses during different periods of
high global labor migration.
16. David Held & Anthony McGrew, The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction,
in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER 1, 3 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2d
ed. 2003).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id.
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First, globalization drives global labor migration through the
integration of the global economy, which is marked by an exponentially
increased focus of producers on a non-national market orientation.20 In
turn, these producers lobby for (and often receive) liberalization of
capital and trade restrictions, 21 which are justified on David Ricardo's
theory of comparative advantage. 22 In this manner, multinational
enterprises are able to proliferate and spread their reach much more
easily across the world. This easing of trade and capital, in turn,
incentivizes firms and some policymakers to seek easing of the
movement of people (employees, executives, and trading partners), as
well. 23 I refer to this phenomenon as the "Global Mobility Triad."
Not only do transnational entities wish to ease the movement of
people, but globalization has also made emigration more attractive-due
heavily to the wealth and income disparities that globalization has
exacerbated. 24 These disparities have produced a strong incentive for
unskilled labor migrants to emigrate to richer countries with higher
wage rates, as can be seen with Mexico-U.S., Morocco-Spain, and
Indian-U.A.E. labor flows, among others. Even in the face of physically
arduous journeys and harsh anti-immigration laws, the utility calculus
still continues to weigh in favor of migration. 25
Secondly, global labor migration is part of the globalization that
people perceive as an external force. That is, from a citizen's
perspective, globalization is a force that acts from outside of the
respective polity. 26 This viewpoint is fundamentally flawed, as
globalization is not an external force, but rather is deeply embedded in
20. Peter Dicken, A New Geo-economy, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER,
supra note 16, at 303.
21. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement pt. I-III, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
296-456; North American Free Trade Agreement pt. IV-VIII, Dec. 17, 1992, 612-799,
649-57, 663-64, 671-80.
22. DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 80 (3d ed.
1821), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP.html. This theory holds
that, since all countries have an unequal endowment of production factors (labor, land,
and capital), countries will import whatever is most expensive for them to produce, and
export what is best produced given the particular set of economic factors.
23. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS OF REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION 25-26 (2006).
24. Though globalization scholars from many different stripes disagree on the
importance, magnitude, and solutions for the income/wealth gaps seen today, all agree
that in some way or another, globalization has encouraged these results. See Held &
McGrew, supra note 16, at 28-31.
25. To some degree, the 2008 recession has dampened these flows in the United States.
See generally JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010 (2011).
26. John Clarke, Turning Inside Out? Globalization, Neo-liberalism and Welfare
States, 45 ANTHROPOLOGICA 201, 202, 205-06, 209 (2003).
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local and national processes throughout the world.2 7 Yet, global labor
migration's "externality"-among natives considered largely a negative
conception-is important to keep in mind, especially regarding potential
policy prescriptions. To many, globalization and increased immigration
are part of the same external "problem," and immigration restrictions
are oftentimes justified on the basis of combating globalization's
perceived deleterious effect on native workers.28
Natives often see globalization and increased immigration as
cheapening the quality of traditional citizenship among natives, insofar
as citizenship is defined as granting a set of entitlements. Specifically,
restrictionist advocates cite the increased fiscal cost, which
immigrants-legal or otherwise-bring to their receiving countries, as a
justification to slow immigration flows.29 Following this theory,
resources become scarcer for citizens who are more deserving of these
entitlements-by virtue of their bloodline-after immigration flows
increase.30 Additionally, heterogeneous immigrants necessarily take
away the relative homogeneity of a receiving country's population,
which many also perceive as taking from the concept of citizenship. 31
However, globalization has more broadly changed the concept of
citizenship and belonging in more fundamental ways, both for the
citizen and noncitizen. Kitty Calavita suggests that globalization has
weakened the position of citizens relative to their corresponding
territorial nation-states. The rights and freedoms that used to inure in
the citizenship concept have diminished to a degree. Our "social space"
has changed so that the shopping mall has replaced our public forums,
and membership in a community now presupposes membership in the
consumer market.32 Calavita suggests that because of an immigrant's
27. Id. at 205-06.
28. See, e.g., PBS Newshour: Free Trade Hurts American Workers, AFL-CIO Director
Says (Feb. 14, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bbfbusiness/jan-june07/globalization_0
2-14.html.
29. See, e.g., JACK MARTIN & ERIC A. RUARK, FED'N AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, THE
FISCAL BURDEN OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ON UNITED STATES TAXPAYERS 87 (2011).
30. But not by their place of birth. Restrictionist advocates detest the jus soli aspect of
citizenship as it exists in the United States, since undocumented immigrants can imbue
U.S. citizenship in their children simply by giving birth to them within the United States.
See id. at 5.
31. Notably, this effect is much more apparent in Europe and other countries than in
the United States. This is especially so, since the United States' foundation myth is itself
based on immigrants of different ethnicities and languages, in contrast to the
ethnicity-based foundation myths of European countries and others. Jack Citrin & John
Sides, Immigration and the Imagined Community in Europe and the United States, 56
POL. STUD. 33, 34 (2008).
32. KITTY CALAVITA, IMMIGRANTS AT THE MARGINS: LAW, RACE, AND EXCLUSION IN
SOUTHERN EUROPE 163 (2005).
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perceived inability to participate in consumption, they cannot belong to
the social space of the post-modern, globalized world.33
Calavita's theory may reinforce the theories behind an immigrant's
exclusion by the global elite. Extending the theory, immigrants are
perceived as taking native jobs away-and thus taking natives out of
the new social space of consumption. Thus, labor-driven immigrants are
seen not only to usurp a native's traditional citizenship, but also their
position as a consumer, which is now central to the conception of
belonging in a globalized world. Accordingly, immigration regulations
justified on immigration's perceived negative economic impact may find
greater support among natives under this logic.
B. The Response of the United States to Global Labor Migration
Taken together, the forces and concepts of globalization have
uniquely altered global migration flows, shaped the corresponding
responses of nation-states, and exacerbated the above-mentioned racial,
cultural, and societal animosities in profound ways. Nation-states have
responded to these changes with a variety of measures, not all of them
successful. Protectionist fears-both economic and sociocultural-drive
some responses, while pragmatic and economics-based incentives drive
others.
The United States has chosen to develop a complicated immigration
strategy, where legal immigration is contingent on (1) family or
employer ties to the United States,34 (2) ability to pay, and (3) lack of
disqualifying factors such as criminal or terrorist behavior, public
health risks, and a wide variety of others.35 Because of this high bar,
many intending immigrants to the United States-especially from
Mexico and other proximate Central American countries-have chosen
to skirt the legalities of the U.S. immigration regime and enter illegally,
for the very reasons globalization has pushed those immigrants. The
United States civilly punishes illegal entrants with removal upon
notification of their "entry without inspection," with some relief
provisions available in select cases. 36
33. Id.
34. For statutes relating to immigration paths for relatives of U.S. citizens and legal
permanent resides see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151 (2012) and id. § 1153.
35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) (relating to inadmissibility factors); id. § 1227 (relating
to deportability factors).
36. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A),(a)(9) (2012), 1227(a)(1)(A) (entry without inspection);
id. § 1229a (removal proceedings); id. § 1229b (cancellation of removal and adjustment of
Status); id. § 1229c (voluntary departure).
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Such deterring factors have not quelled the quest for the perceived
riches of the United States. Illegal immigration flows continued to surge
in the 2000s, and after a dip from the global recession in 2008, the flows
remain strong still today.37 According to 2011 data from the Pew
Research Center, approximately 11.1 million unauthorized workers live
in the United States today.38 Even after numerous countermeasures
were taken at the federal level,39 illegal immigration to the United
States still occurs, albeit in reduced numbers.
As a result, certain individual states have resorted to restrictionist
immigration laws. These laws vary to some degree, but all attempt to (1)
expand the authority and responsibilities of state and local law
enforcement officials in enforcing federal immigration law, and (2) make
life difficult for unauthorized immigrants in their respective
jurisdictions. Many of these laws have been preliminarily declared
unconstitutional, but some have withstood constitutional scrutiny, and
litigation is still pending.40 Their constitutionality notwithstanding,
these restrictionist laws suggest not only discontent with the federal
government's enforcement of immigration or "illegal" immigration, but
with immigration itself. Further, the effect of these so-called "Juan
Crow" laws41 has indeed served to turn some of these states into no-man
zones for immigrants, legal42 or not-especially Alabama, where the
most stringent of provisions had previously survived judicial review. 43
Restrictionist advocacy groups have justified these laws by noting
that (1) "illegal" immigration skirts the rule of law-i.e., illegal
immigration is bad, because of its illegality;44 (2) illegal immigration is a
national security concern, because those who cross the border illegally
37. See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 25, at 1.
38. See Jeffrey Passel & D'Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrants: 11.1 Million in 2011,
PEw HIsPANIC CENTER (Dec. 6, 2012) http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/12/06/unauthor
ized-immigrants-11-1-million-in-2011/.
39. See, e.g., Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012); Hispanic
Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012).
41. David Person, 'Juan Crow' Law Alive in Alabama, USA TODAY (Nov. 1, 2011, 5:28
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/story/2011-11-01/alabama-illega
1-immigration-law/51031138/1.
42. Phillip Rawls, Many Legal Immigrants Leaving Alabama Behind, SPOKESMAN-REv.
(Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2011/oct/06/many-legal-immigrants-lea
ving-alabama-behind/.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1345 (S.D. Ala. 2011)
(upholding a prohibition on contracts with unlawfully present aliens), rev'd, 691 F.3d 1269
(11th Cir. 2012).
44. See, e.g., Lamar Smith, Adhere to the Rule of Law on Immigration Policy, WASH.
TIMES (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/24/smith-adhere-
to-rule-of-law-on-immigration-policy/.
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are not inspected for health, security, or criminal concerns, like legal
immigrants-though not necessarily natural-born citizens-would be;4 5
(3) illegal immigration applies negative fiscal pressures on states and
the federal government;46 and (4) immigration of any type takes jobs
and wages away from more deserving natives. 47
This note argues that these laws are misguided and their
underlying justifications are specious. In essence, these laws are
strikingly similar to the anti-Chinese laws of the First Era of
Globalization-with nearly identical justifications. An economic
analysis of labor migration does not lead to the conclusion that migrants
unduly hurt native wage rates; rather, the analysis shows that these
rates remain relatively unchanged or show only very weak losses.
Further, the global economy gains from migrant movement and gross
world product increases, as labor migrants would not move without a
likelihood of increasing their economic well-being. 48 In addition, the
gross domestic product of both sending and receiving countries
increases.
Additionally, the argument surrounding illegality can be easily
disarmed. Were there no restrictions on immigration, "illegal"
immigration would not be a problem per se, as no immigrant could
violate nonexistent immigration law. Yet, the restrictionist lobby would
undoubtedly call for some restriction, even though there were no
"illegal"49 immigrants to catch. This is because such organizations are
opposed not only to "illegal" immigration, but immigration itself.5 0
Further, even if there were some restrictions on immigration, such
as designated entry and exit waypoints or a ban on felons, a system that
allowed for the migration of poor, unskilled laborers5 1 would mitigate
rational national security concerns. Immigration enforcement
45. See, e.g., Rowan Scarborough, Illegal Immigration is a National Security Issue,
HUM. EVENTS (May 6, 2010, 3:01 AM), http://www.humanevents.comlarticle.php?id=3685
1.
46. See generally MARTIN & RUARK, supra note 29 (discussing the concerns of cost
related to health, security, and criminal activity).
47. See generally ERIC A. RUARK & MArrHEW GRAHAM, FED'N AM. IMMIGR. REFORM,
IMMIGRATION, POVERTY, AND Low WAGE EARNERS: THE HARMFUL EFFECT OF UNSKILLED
IMMIGRANTS ON AMERICAN WORKERS (2011).
48. See infra Part III.
49. Insofar as the term applies to the group of people who fit the common conception of
"illegal immigrants." See supra note 11. I do not refer to those who are "illegal" because of
substantive criminal or security concerns that make them inadmissible to or deportable
from the United States.
50. See FED'N AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, AN IMMIGRATION REFORM AGENDA FOR THE 112TH
CONGRESS 7-8 (2011) (calling for a reduction in overall immigration levels to the United
States).
51. See infra Part III, B.
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authorities would be free to focus on true illegality-i.e., those who skirt
the entry or exit requirements because of criminal, security, or other
serious issues that are otherwise unrelated to qualifying for
immigration status.
Instead, our focus on "illegal" immigration obscures the target of our
national immigration policy; to be "illegal," something must be
"illegalized." The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries' immigration
laws illegalized Chinese immigrants because of their race and
nationality.52 Yet, the rhetoric spoke of exclusion based on race,
nationality, or other characteristics-not illegality. Today, we have
illegalized another group-not facially on the basis of race, but on
socioeconomic lines: low or unskilled, poor workers from developing
nations. State laws that build on this new policy work within the
framework of immigrant "illegality." This definition often gets caught up
in discriminatory racial, societal, and cultural notions, and will be
explored later. Policymakers cannot forget that by rallying against
"illegal" immigration, one should never forget who has been
"illegalized," whether directly by race, nationality, or otherwise.
Finally, from a normatively global standpoint, diminished borders
and increased migration bring the world a net good. They do so for a
variety of reasons, some of which are peculiar to the United States.
First, freer movement of labor-helped along by economic
globalization-is normatively good for the world and local economies.
Given the currently depressed state of such economies, freer
immigration policies would be a welcome boon. Second, a freer
immigration policy meshes well with the historical notion of citizenship
and belonging in the United States. Because the identity of a United
States citizen is not intrinsically tied to an ethnicity-which is different
from countries as disparate as France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, or
Japan-it is much easier, politically and practically, to adopt such a
system.53 Finally, a "freer" immigration control policy does not require
(nor should it) a system of absolute free immigration. Both to make such
a policy palatable to resistant constituencies and to provide for effective
international efforts against crime and terrorism, the securitization of
borders should be preserved.
52. Among other racial, social, and even political groups. See, e.g., Immigration Act of
1917, 39 Stat. 874, 875-77 (1917) (barring all homosexuals, criminals, "idiots, ...
feeble-minded persons, epileptics, insane persons, . . . alcoholi[cs], . . . professional
beggars, ... polygamists, ... anarchists," illiterates, and anyone from a wide swath of
Asia, extending from the Ottoman Empire to present-day Papua New Guinea, from
admission to the United States).
53. See Citrin & Sides, supra note 31, at 34.
THE RECURRING NATIVE RESPONSE TO GLOBAL LABOR MIGRATION 1405
II. IMMIGRATION REGULATION IN A GLOBALIZING CONTEXT
This section will explore the foundations and dynamics of the
relative periods of globalization and analyze their corresponding
anti-immigration laws. Four areas of inquiry exist in this section: First,
what are the laws and what is their structure? Second, what are the
goals behind the laws? Third, what are the laws' actual effects, and do
they comport with the laws' goals? Finally, what were the justifications
underlying these laws, do the goals and effects necessarily follow from
them, and are they normatively sound?
A. The First Era of Globalization
The influx of foreign laborers to the United States in the mid- to
late-1800s was part and parcel of globalizing processes and a globalizing
mindset at work during this era. Largely thanks to heavy European
investment, international trade and capital transfers rose
significantly. 54 Further, there were few barriers to the flow of
goods-and virtually none for capital. And, during this period-as
opposed to the current period of globalization-people could flow a great
deal easier, at least from a legal perspective. Here, all three points of
the Global Mobility Triad are visible. This was thanks to, among other
factors, lax border controls, the influence of powerful business interests,
and overall elite support for open migration.55 Today, technology has
facilitated both better availability of quick travel and a greater
integration of peoples around the world. The latter phenomenon might
lay expectations that people should move, and travel, to their maximum
benefit. However, today the will of the governing elite seems to be more
responsive to popular nativist demands and less permissive of open
immigration policies that business elite favored in the First Era of
Globalization.
In the United States, this trend emerged in the middle of the
nineteenth century. The opening of the American frontier brought
owners of capital and land, but few laborers to work the land or fill its
factories. Owing to this, and the Irish Potato Famine from 1845 to 1852,
Irish immigrants flowed into the United States in vast numbers.56
54. See Schularick & Steger, supra note 6, at 757.
55. But see Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776-1875), 93 COLUm. L. REV. 1833, 1884 (1993) (contending generally that many state
immigration laws existed-if not by name-prior to the Chinese immigration period, but
conceding that these laws often did not actually prevent immigration).
56. Lawrence H. Fuchs & Susan F. Martin, Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest, in THOMAS A.
1406 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
Though they certainly encountered resistance from the natives, many
Irish were eventually able to assimilate into American society, given
their relative racial homogeneity.5 7
The next wave of immigrants was not so fortunate. A large influx of
Chinese immigrants resulted from increasing work opportunities in the
American West provided by the California Gold Rush, and later on the
Transcontinental Railroad.58 From 1860 to 1890, Chinese immigrants
constituted about 9 percent of California's population.59
Anti-Chinese sentiment among natives was rampant. Initially,
native miners organized against attempts to import cheaper Chinese
labor, especially in mining camps where native miners tended to
congregate.6 0 The resistance movement eventually moved to the cities,
where Chinese immigrants had concentrated in "Chinatowns."
After meeting with limited success at the grassroots level,
anti-Chinese activists petitioned their local and state governments for
redress. The California state government first responded in 1850 with a
tax on foreign miners, and eventually attempted to bar Chinese
immigrants from working, and even living, in California cities.61 Many
towns passed ordinances barring Chinese immigrants from working in
occupations that were typical for the Chinese population, such as
mining, fishing, and Laundromat operations. 62 Anti-Chinese activists
also attempted to deny civil rights to the Chinese population, even to
permanent residents and U.S. citizens of Chinese ancestry. Some towns
even attempted to directly forbid Chinese immigrants from living within
their municipalities. 63 Even the Supreme Court of California held that a
white man, accused of murder based solely on the testimony of Chinese
witnesses, could not be found guilty of murder under California law,
because the witness' race rendered them incompetent to testify.64
Ultimately, however, these efforts faced strong resistance from the
business community and religious leaders, and many were ruled as
either unconstitutional or violating the Burlingame Treaty.65 These
ALEINKOFF ET AL, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 158, 161-64 (6th
ed. 2008).
57. Id. at 163.
58. Eric W. Fong & William T. Markham, Anti-Chinese Politics in California in the
1870s: An Intercounty Analysis, 45 SOC. PERSP. 183, 187-88 (2002).
59. Id. at 187.
60. Id. at 189.
61. Id. at 189, 193.
62. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (laundry).
63. Fong & Markham, supra note 58, at 193.
64. See People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854).
65. Fong & Markham, supra note 58, at 191. See also, e.g., Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20
Cal. 534 (1862) (holding a head tax on Chinese immigrants in certain industries as
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defeats eventually led to national action with the Chinese Exclusion
Act.66 In a surprise to many modern Americans, prophylactic
immigration restrictions at the federal level did not exist until this
time.6 7 The Chinese Exclusion Act barred Chinese immigration to the
United States for a period of ten years, was renewed multiple times, and
ultimately made permanent in 1904.68 The Act was not repealed until
1943.69
The Chinese Exclusion Case, which upheld the constitutionality of
the Act, cites the justifications for many of these laws. The Supreme
Court quotes from the proceedings of California's constitutional
convention, when it constructed California's second constitution:
[T]he presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful effect
upon the material interests of the state, and upon public
morals; that their immigration was in numbers
approaching the character of an Oriental invasion, and
was a menace to our civilization; that the discontent
from this cause was not confined to any political party,
or to any class or nationality, but was . . . universal; that
they retained the habits and customs of their own
country, and ... constituted a Chinese settlement within
the state, without any interest in [the United States] or
its institutions."70
Thus, culminating with the Chinese Exclusion Act, the First Era of
Globalization saw a long are of nativist legislative response to open
immigration policies in the United States. Unfortunately for business
owners and migrants, nativist policy goals controlled Congress during
this period. Additionally, the Supreme Court refused to strike down
preempted by federal immigration law); Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal.
1879) (holding that San Francisco violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause when it enforced an ordinance requiring "queues"-a then-vogue braided hairstyle
among Chinese men-to be cut off during a course of imprisonment).
66. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).
67. Laws referring to and regulating citizenship and naturalization did arise prior to
this. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4, amend. XIV. In addition, the Alien and
Sedition Acts did grant the President power to deport certain "dangerous" aliens after
arrival in the United States, but no federal law-with the exception of the Page Act, see
LULBHELD, supra note 2-had created a class of aliens to whom entry was flatly denied.
68. Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1630, 33 Stat. 428.
69. Magnuson Act, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600 (1948) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 49, 262, 263-71,
293, 294, 299).
70. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 595-96
(1889) (emphasis added).
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these restrictions on constitutional grounds-establishing the broad
authority given to Congress and the executive branch under the plenary
power to regulate immigration and naturalization laws.71
Lastly, it is important to outline the structure, effects (both
intended and actual), and justifications for these laws, for effective
comparison to current state immigration laws. For laws from this era,
the process is rather simple: structurally, these laws directly regulated
the living conditions, work opportunities, and immigration legality of
Chinese immigrants squarely on their race and nationality. These laws
were directly intended to keep Chinese immigrants out of the political
community, labor market, and, ultimately, off of the land itself. Though
these laws ran into some backlash from business and religious
communities-as well as from the Chinese immigrants
themselveS72 -after the Chinese Exclusion Act, immigration opponents
largely achieved their goals. Chinese immigration was flatly banned in
the United States. Finally, the justifications of these laws should be
readily apparent. The laws were prompted by a populist reaction to a
culturally, societally, and racially distinct "other"; the society was afraid
of economic despondency on the one hand, and cultural, societal, racial,
and political fragmentation on the other. In short, the Chinese were
"illegalized" on the basis of their race, because of economic and cultural
fear.
B. The Current Era of Globalization
Today, the world has been undergoing a period of globalization since
the fall of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s. 3 Contrary to the
First Era of Globalization, the exponential growth of
technology-especially in telecommunications and international
travel-has led to much deeper economic integration than was possible
in that era. Trade and capital move very quickly at the behest of
transnational organizations; though, of course nation-states had to
originally cede some of their sovereignty in trade and capital
agreements.74
71. See generally id. at 603-10 (emphasizing the power inherent in the sovereign to
exclude foreigners). Note that the plenary power receives particular deference because of
its extra-constitutionality. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936) ("investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did
not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.").
72. Fong & Markham, supra note 58, at 190.
73. SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL To GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES 167-68 (2008).
74. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-ame
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Here, two points of the Global Mobility Triad-capital and
goods-appear again. However, today we live with a vast web of
restrictive-and largely effective-migration regulations among the
developed world.7 5 These restrictions were certainly not present in the
First Era; and even though, and perhaps because, the proliferation of
communications and transport technologies makes global migration
possible, nation-states have built up legal barriers to immigrants
worldwide-especially those from developing nations.
Why have nation-states built these walls and made the movement of
people flow so slowly? This is an especially salient question given the
great marginal economic gains that could be made by people across the
world given more open migration policies. 76
The two periods of globalization afford us an opportunity to compare
their restrictionist laws and underlying justifications. Though it has
been well over one hundred years since the passage of the Chinese
Exclusion Act, the motives of humans do not change all that much when
a racially, culturally, and socially disparate "other" moves into a
territory that natives thought of as their "own." Yet, our political
sensibilities-as well as newer constitutional directives-have made
laws such as the Chinese Exclusion Act nearly untenable in the United
States today.77
In comparing these laws to current globalization-driven
restrictionist immigration laws, we find that, to achieve the same effect
of keeping out undesirable "others," there are the same underlying
patterns as in the First Era of Globalization, but couched in politically
palatable rhetoric. The United States has once again "illegalized" a
certain type of immigrant-not squarely on the basis of their
race 7 8-but rather on the basis of their socioeconomic status, which
rican-free-trade-agreement-nafta (creating the world's largest free trade area that links
450 million people producing $17 trillion worth of goods and services).
75. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 911 (contributing to Global
Mobility Triad process). This Act replaced the former National Origins Formula (which
facially discriminated against immigrants on the basis of nationality and, ultimately, race)
with the United States' current family/employment-based system. This Act should not be
seen as an overt signal from the U.S. government for greater immigration levels; rather,
the Act is best seen as part of the 1960's civil rights movement, in that it completely
removed the facial consideration of race from U.S. immigration policy.
76. See infra Part III.
77. See generally Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (applying the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment to race-based discriminations of the federal government).
78. Such a classification might nevertheless survive constitutional scrutiny. See Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (finding an illegitimacy classification-which is typically
analyzed under intermediate scrutiny-permissible, even if lacking a reasoned
explanation from Congress, since it was a classification made in connection with alien
admissibility); see also Dunn v. INS, 499 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that a Mexican
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happens to peculiarly intermesh, statistically, and as a matter of
identity, with race and nationality.7 9 Thus, while the state laws have
similar effects, their underlying justifications are also the same once the
layers of the "illegalization" arguments are peeled away.
Of course, not every state passed an identical immigration law. But,
in general, the mechanisms of the laws are largely similar-with some
harsher than others. The goals of state immigration legislation largely
overlap as well, though many are more cognizant of economic and
political realities that dampen the restrictionist position. In sum, these
laws generally seek to reduce the population of "illegal" immigrants
within their jurisdictions. The justifications for state restrictionist
immigration legislation are largely similar, as outlined in the
introduction of this note.
The law most deserving of analysis is Arizona's S.B. 1070, which
was the first of these restrictionist immigration laws to be enacted. The
law contains the following provisions:80
(1) A prohibition on state and local law enforcement
agencies against restricting enforcement of federal
immigration laws.81 Legal residents may sue law
enforcement agencies that engage in such activity. 82
(2) A requirement that law enforcement officers
"reasonab[ly] attempt" to determine the immigration
status of a person in "lawful contact" with a law
enforcement officer where "reasonable suspicion" of that
person's unlawful presence exists.8 3
(3) Codification of a number of new immigration related
crimes, notably failure to carry an alien registration
document; 84 hiring or attempting to hire workers on a
citizen was not entitled to discretionary reentry and that statute denying discretionary
relief to residents of western hemisphere countries is unconstitutional).
79. See Nicholas P. De Genova, Migrant 'lllegality" and Deportability in Everyday Life,
31 ANN. REV. ANTHRO. 419, 433 (2002).
80. The description below outlines the laws as passed. Many provisions have been
preliminarily or permanently enjoined by federal courts, as elaborated upon in the "actual
effects" discussion below.
81. S.B. 1070, 2d Reg. Sess. § 2(A) (Ariz. 2010) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
11-1051(A) (2012)).
82. Id. § 2(G)-(I) (codified at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(G)-(I) (2012)).
83. Id. § 2(B) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(A) (2012)).
84. Id. § 3(A) (codified at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509(A) (2012)).
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street8 5 or entering a vehicle to be hired,86 if it impedes
the normal flow of traffic; for unlawfully present aliens,
knowingly applying for or soliciting for work;87 and
recklessly concealing, harboring, or transporting an
undocumented alien.88
(4) A prohibition on unauthorized8 9 aliens applying for
work.
(5) A restriction of all state and local benefits to U.S.
citizens and legal permanent residents.9 0
Arizona also passed an immigration law in 2007, which other states
have incorporated into their state immigration laws.91 The following
provisions came as a result of that legislation:
(1) Loss of business licenses for employers of
unauthorized aliens; 92 and
(2) A general requirement to use E-Verify93 for all
employers in the state. 94
85. Id. § 5(13-2928) (A) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(A) (2012)).
86. Id. § 5(13-2928) (B) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(A) (2012)).
Interestingly, Sections 5(A) and 5(B) apply to anyone, not just unauthorized aliens.
87. Id. § 5(13-2928) (C) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (2012)).
88. Id. § 5(13-2929)(A)(1)-(3) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2929(A)(1)-(3)
(2012)).
89. The term "unauthorized alien," as it pertains to SB 1070, means one who is not
authorized to work. See id. § 5(13-2928)(E)(2) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2928(E)(2) (2012)). "Unlawful aliens" are unlawfully present in the United States.
Certain aliens may be legally present in the United States, but not authorized to work,
such as B-Visa tourists or F-2 spouses of foreign students.
90. 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 0211, § 1. This separate legislation was House Bill 2162,
which amended SB 1070 in certain respects and was passed concurrently with it.
91. Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211, 212.01,
214(A) (Supp. 2010). These provisions survived a constitutional challenge by the United
States Chamber of Commerce. Specifically, the revocation of business licenses for
employers of unauthorized aliens, and the general E-Verify requirement were upheld by
the Supreme Court. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
92. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212.01(F)(1)(c).
93. E-Verify is a service of the United States Department of Homeland Security and
Social Security Administration that allows employers to verify the immigration status of
their employees. See What is E-Verify?, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Jan. 9,
2013), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d
1411
1412 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIEs 20:2
Finally, a requirement in S.B. 1070 stipulates that, in implementing
the foregoing provisions, no consideration of race, color, or national
origin may be used, except as permitted by the Arizona or U.S.
Constitutions.95
Other independent state provisions of note find themselves largely
in Alabama's H.B. 56, the so-called "toughest immigration law in the
country."96 In addition to parallel provisions to those outlined above,
this law prohibits the enforcement of many contracts between
unlawfully present aliens and other parties;97 denies admission to public
colleges and universities to unlawfully present aliens;98 and finally,
mandates public schools to determine students' immigration status
(lawful or unlawful), to send to the state in a yearly report.99 Georgia,100
Utah,101 and South Carolinal 02 have all enacted provisions similar to
Arizona's, but do not include the provisions of the Alabama law.
The theoretical basis for these laws is popularly called "attrition
through enforcement,"103 which is touted by restrictionist advocates as a
way to stop illegal immigration without the enormous costs of mass
forced removal or an unpalatable mass-grant of amnesty. 104 Kris
Kobach,105 a law professor at the University of Missouri-Kansas City
la/?vgnextoid=e94888e60a40511OVgnVCM100000471819aRCRD&vgnextchannel=e9488
8e60a4051 10VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD.
94. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214(A).
95. Id. § 13-2929(C).
96. Richard Fausset, Alabama Enacts Anti-Illegal-Immigration Law Described as
Nation's Strictest, L.A. TIMES (June 10, 2011) http://articles.1atimes.com/2011/jun/10/na
tion/la-na-alabama-immigration-20110610.
97. Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Laws
535, § 27.
98. Id. § 8.
99. Id. § 28.
100. Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, 2011 Ga. Laws 252.
101. Utah Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, 2011 Utah Laws 021. Utah also passed
other laws as part of an immigration package, including some which purport to establish a
guest worker program for undocumented workers, and other more immigrant-friendly
provisions than other states are employing. See, e.g., Utah Immigration Accountability
and Enforcement Amendments, 2011 Utah Laws 018.
102. Act of June 30, 2011, 2011 S.C. Acts 69.
103. S.B. 1070, 2d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ariz. 2010).
104. See generally Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational
Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 155 (2008) (addressing the
false dichotomy that exists within the public debate surrounding immigration).
105. It should be noted that while Mr. Kobach hails from the Republican Party, nativist
(and pro-immigration) sentiments do not necessarily split nicely upon party lines. For
example, many libertarian or pro-business Republicans favor more open immigration
policy. See, e.g., Immigration, THE CATO INST., http://www.cato.org/researchlimmigration.
Conversely, protectionist, pro-union Democrats have historically disfavored open
immigration policies-though have more recently come to largely favor more open
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School of Law, and currently Kansas' Secretary of State, has been the
most outspoken proponent of such laws, and was instrumental in
crafting the state laws outlined above. 106
Attrition through enforcement intends to make life very difficult for
unlawfully present immigrants in these jurisdictions, in some cases
even extending punishment to friends and family who consort with
those unlawfully present. 107 It does so through the criminalization of
life-sustaining activities-even presence within a state-while
simultaneously expanding the permissible role of law enforcement
agencies and officers in enforcing federal immigration laws. Certainly,
unlike the anti-Chinese laws of the First Era of Globalization, these
laws do not seek to ban immigrants on the basis of race; indeed, all of
these laws contain explicit provisions barring such a consideration.1 08
Rather, immigrants are excluded on the basis of their "illegality."
Having studied and compared the structure of the laws, it is
important to look at the effects-intended and actual-of these laws and
compare them to the effects of restrictionist laws from the First Era of
Globalization. Quite bluntly, the intended effect of current laws is to
reduce the inflows of illegal immigration to states-specifically to
"discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and
economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United
States."109 Particularly, the aim is to do so through Mr. Kobach's
"attrition through enforcement" regime. 10
In reality, many parts of the laws have not had much chance to take
effect, as federal judges have blocked many of the provisions.111 The
provisions of Arizona's law that have taken effect are (1) the E-Verify
requirement and suspension of business licenses,112 (2) the requirement
of law enforcement agencies to not restrict enforcement of federal
immigration laws, (3) the prohibition of public benefits, and (4) the
immigration policies. See Joseph T. Hapak, Book Review, 8 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 124
(1988) (reviewing GWENDOLYN MINK, OLD LABOR AND NEW IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: UNION, PARTY, AND STATE, 1875-1920 (1986)).
106. See Julia Preston, Lawyer Leads an Immigration Fight, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21lawyer.html.
107. See Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala.
Laws 535, § 13 (criminalizing any attempt to "conceal, habor, or shield from detection ...
encourage or induce . .. to come in or reside in [Alabama] ... or transport [any alien with
knowledge or reckless disregard of their unlawful presence]").
108. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2929(C) (2010).
109. S.B. 1070, 2d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ariz. 2010).
110. See id. ("[T]he intent of [SB 1070] is to make attrition through enforcement the
public policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona.").
111. See supra note 15 and infra note 114.
112. The Supreme Court recently approved of these provisions. Chamber of Commerce
v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1986-87 (2011).
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requirement that law enforcement officers make a "reasonable attempt"
to determine a person's immigration status upon a lawful contact with
reasonable suspicion of unlawful status. The provisions of Alabama's
law that have been upheld notably include (a) the requirement to
ascertain immigration status during a lawful stop by a law enforcement
officer, 13 and (b) the requirement of proof of lawful presence to conduct
business with Alabama governments." 4
In addition to the legal effect of these laws, the laws' perceived
effects-and the perception of immigrant hostility in general-have
caused real consequences among immigrant populations. The Alabama
law, in particular, has led to a flight of legal and "illegal" immigrants
from the state."15 Arizona's law has had similar effects, though much of
the immigrant flight from the state can be attributed to the impact of
the recession mixing with the effect of perceived persecution from the
legislation." 6 Thus, the restrictionist advocates have at least partially
achieved their goals, even without full implementation of the laws.117
113. In contrast to the Arizona litigation, where an analogous provision did remain
preliminarily enjoined. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 353-54 (9th Cir. 2011),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). However, the U.S. Supreme
Court later removed the injunction as to that provision, holding it is not preempted by
federal law. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2508.
114. See United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1282-83, 1285-98 (11th Cir. 2012)
(striking down provisions (1) requiring aliens to carry registration documents, (2)
criminalizing knowing application, solicitation, or performance of work by an
unauthorized alien, (3) criminalizing transporting, harboring, and inducement of aliens,
(4) prohibiting state tax deductions for unlawful alien employees, (5) providing a cause of
action for U.S. citizens not hired by an employer who instead hires an unlawful alien, and
(6) prohibiting courts from enforcing any contracts entered in to, in part, by an unlawful
alien); Hispanic Int. Coal. of Alabama v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012) (striking
down the citizenship verification requirement for students as violating the Equal
Protection Clause).
115. Rawls, supra note 42.
116. Illegal Immigrants Leaving Arizona Over New Law, CBS NEWS (Apr. 29, 2010,
10:14 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/29/nationallmain6442729.shtml.
117. Of course, there are numerous unintended effects of the laws as well, including
remaining immigrants keeping a "low-profile," non-cooperation with law enforcement
officers in the reporting of criminal activity, and failure to seek medical attention, all due
to fear of apprehension. See, e.g., Daniel GonzAlez, Senate Bill 1070: One Year Later, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC (Apr. 23, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/12news/news/articles/2011/
04/23/20110423arizona-immigration-law-impact-year-later.html. Further, if flight of
immigrants was, as stated, merely a means to economic advancement of the targeted
jurisdictions, early empirical data indicates that these laws generally failed. Professor
Huyen Pham undertook an extensive empirical study of restrictionist laws enacted
between 2005 and 2007. See Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, The Economic Impact of
Local Immigration Regulation: An Empirical Analysis, 32 CARDozo L. REv. 485 (2010).
The study shows that, contrary to the economic arguments offered against "illegal"
immigration, restrictionist laws led to a small decrease in employment rates. Id. at 488.
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Compared to the laws in the First Era of Globalization, current
laws' intended and actual effects largely mirror each other, though
current state legislators, not daring to legislate on the basis of race, do
not implicate the constitutional concerns which arose in challenges to
anti-Chinese laws.
III. JUSTIFYING PARADIGMS
Finally, we must examine what lies behind these laws; how their
proponents justify the end result of a reduction in illegal (and overall)
migration to their jurisdictions. Further, to understand how
globalization plays into these justifications, we will compare them to
justifications given for anti-Chinese immigration laws. Four principal
arguments were identified above: (1) The Fiscal Argument, (2) The
Economic Argument, (3) The Security Argument, and (4) The Rule of
Law or "Illegality" Argument. 18 These arguments are best divided into
(a) Economic Arguments (Economic and Fiscal) and (b) "Illegality"
Arguments (Security and Rule of Law).
A. Economic Arguments Against Global Labor Migration
The restrictionist lobby often highlights the fiscal cost of
immigration, as evidenced by the entitlements that immigrants and
their families allegedly "take.""19 Yet, nonimmigrants, lawful
immigrants, and "illegal" immigrants alike are all barred by federal law
from receiving any means-tested benefit directly.120 They may, however,
claim entitlements on behalf of their U.S. citizen children, since those
children are not otherwise barred. This argument, while implicating
critical notions of national belonging, which globalization impacts, is
focused on nationality laws, and not immigration laws. Thus, a lengthy
discussion is beyond the scope of this piece. Suffice to say that these
arguments would be better focused on either the merits of entitlement
laws themselves or the merits of the nationality laws, rather than
casting blame solely on those who choose to immigrate legally or
"illegally."
118. See supra Part I.
119. MARTIN & RUARK, supra note 29.
120. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, §§ 400-51 (1996). Those without lawful immigration status are
further barred from various benefits by federal, state, and local regulations. See generally
Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115 (2009) (outlining
and critiquing such regulations).
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Additionally, the restrictionist immigration lobby consistently
claims that increased levels of immigration-regardless of its
illegality-has a negative economic effect on natives in the United
States.121 The argument goes that immigrants come to the receiving
country, and "take" American jobs with vastly higher wage levels. 122
Thus, the native no longer has the opportunity to fill that position, since
the immigrant is often willing to work for less than the native; as from
the immigrant's perspective, the wage level is a vast improvement over
that prevailing in the sending country.123 Here, we see the negative
native reaction to Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage as applied
to global labor migration. 124 If true, this should show a negative impact
on native employment and wage rates.
This argument has three fundamental flaws. Natives are not
necessarily concerned about labor-market competition within their own
labor market,125 despite the anti-immigrant lobby's claims. Secondly,
the basic notion of an "American" job is specious; the definition is vague
and ultimately circular. If an "American" job is one that belongs to those
legally authorized to work in the United States (as the arguments
against illegal immigration must presuppose), then the definition
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: American jobs belong only to those
the government deems expedient, which as explained below, currently
does not include poor, unskilled, non-native laborers. 126 If, on the other
121. RUARK & GRAHAM, supra note 47.
122. There is clear empirical support for the proposition that international labor
migration flows are highly responsive to the per capita income rate in the receiving
country. See Francesc Ortega & Giovanni Peri, The Effect of Income and Immigration
Policies on International Migration 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
18322, 2012).
123. This argument has typically been seen as a factor influencing anti-immigrant
attitudes based on labor market competition fears. But see Jens Hainmueller & Michael J.
Hiscox, Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe, 61
IN'L ORG. 399, 413-38 (2007). The authors conclude that the 2003 European Social
Survey indicates that labor-market competition fears alone do not correlate with support
for restrictionist immigration policies. Instead, they argue that higher native education
levels correspond with an increased likelihood to support pro-immigration policies. This is
a plausible explanation, yet it presumes perfect information flows to the survey's
respondents. Namely, the respondent must understand their own labor market position
relative to the immigrant's, and further presumes that identifying the immigrant only as
"from [sending country]" will sufficiently identify that immigrant. Additionally,
respondents may not necessarily be opposed to labor market competition within their own
labor market, but the national labor market in general (i.e., the notion of "American" jobs).
124. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
125. See Hainmueller & Hiscox, supra note 123.
126. Some scholars, notably Joseph Carens, argue that it is morally indefensible for
countries to refuse the admission and employment of law-abiding immigrants, no matter
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hand, an "American" job belongs only to U.S. citizens, that definition is
underinclusive, as many immigrants are lawfully authorized to work in
the United States.
Most importantly, theory and experience have shown that greater
immigration levels do not cause higher unemployment or wage levels in
the receiving country. Many scholars who study the economics of global
labor migration have applied various models of labor market analysis to
study the impact of hypothetical increases or reductions in global
immigration levels.127 To exemplify the theoretical aspects of this
rebuttal with a more accessible model, imagine the world existed of two
countries, Argonia and Nibenay. Argonia is a well-developed nation,
with high wage levels and a high standard of living. Nibenay is still
developing, with fast rates of growth, but overall much lower wage
levels than those found in Argonia. According to labor economists,
loosening immigration restrictions for low-skilled Nibenayen laborers
does indeed produce a vast comparative gain in overall wage levels to
these immigrants. 128 However, the model also suggests, among workers
similarly situated, (1) a relatively small decline in Argonia's wage levels,
and (2) a relatively small increase in Nibenay's wage levels, due to
decreased labor supply. 129 Overall, global welfare rises to varying
degrees depending on the elasticity of the Argonian and Nibenayen
labor demand curves, various externalities caused by the influx of
migrant labor, productivity differences, and diminishing returns of labor
migration. 130 At the end of the day, the economic models suggest that
through open immigration policies, gross world product increases, and
that although receiving-country wage rates decrease, they do not
decrease drastically.
In addition to theoretical models, the real world has data to test this
economic theory. Each successive EU enlargement constitutes the most
recent phenomenon where barriers to labor migration have come down.
David G. Blanchflower and Chad Shadforth authored an impressive
study on the effect of labor migration from the A8 and A10 countries 31
their background. See generally Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open
Borders, 49 REv. POL. 251 (1987).
127. See Michael A. Clemens, Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the
Sidewalk?, J. EcoN. PERSPS., Summer 2011, at 83, 85 (assembling a list of various models
and their results on the global economy).
128. Id. at 89.
129. Id.
130. That is, at some point, the rate of migration will cease depending on the number of
available migrants left, and the conditions in the sending country.
131. A8 refers to the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia. A10 means these countries, plus Bulgaria and Romania. David G.
Blanchflower & Chad Shadforth, Fear, Unemployment and Migration, 119 ECON. J. F136,
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on the United Kingdom. 132 The study found that nominal wage levels,
among natives in occupations most likely to be taken by immigrants,
increased in the time period studied, but the influx of migration caused
their real wages to decrease.133 However, the data also suggests that
inflationary pressures and the natural unemployment rate decreased,
due to the excess of new labor supply over new labor demand. 134 In
essence, wages did not keep up with inflation, but natives-generally
speaking-did not lose their place in the labor market due to an influx
of labor migrants. Thus, from both a theoretical and real-world analysis,
the economic arguments-while still retaining some validity-are
weakened substantially. Further, from a globalized viewpoint, open
migration policies are a net world good.
B. The Rule of Law Arguments Against Global Labor Migration: The
"Illegalization" of Poverty in the Current Era of Globalization
Even if increased labor migration is proven to be beneficial,
additional barriers to migration exist. As Jennifer Gordon astutely puts
it, "people are not bananas"; that is, easing barriers to the flow of people
has profound societal and cultural effects, as compared with easing
barriers to goods and capital.135 In short, if a given migratory group
enters a receiving country with natives who are wholly dissimilar in
cultural and societal aspects, some friction and resistance will
inevitably result.
During the First Era of Globalization, this phenomenon was all too
apparent. As discussed above, the influx of a racially, culturally, and
societally dissimilar group sought by the receiving country's vast labor
demand prompted reactionary and racially discriminatory immigration
laws, which eventually barred the Chinese from immigration on the
basis of their race and nationality.
Today, immigration laws can be equally harsh, but cannot be
justified on similar bases. Thus, we see none of the justifications-even
from the most restrictionist lobbies-containing assertions of racial or
cultural superiority, though they do include notions of societal
F136 (2009), available at http://www.dartmouth.edul-blnchflr/papers/fear%20unemploym
ent%20fulltext.pdf.
132. Id. at F137.
133. Id. at F179.
134. Id. at F179-80
135. Jennifer Gordon, People are Not Bananas: How Immigration Differs from Trade,
104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1109, 1110-11 (2010).
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superiority and tout the benefits of homogeneity. 136 Certainly, any
official justification of these laws focuses on the "illegality" of its targets,
and dares not touch on race or culture. 13 7 Thus, restrictionist policies
are justified in terms of perceived economic harms and the pervasive
"illegality" with which many immigrants are ascribed-regardless of
how they came to the United States. This "illegality" is seen as
harm-in and of itself-to the rule of law, and also carries various
national security concerns with it.138
But how does admonishing "illegal" immigration tie into racial or
cultural animus? After all, when hundreds of thousands of people per
year break a country's civil and criminal immigration laws, those
immigrants are indeed violating the rule of law, which in turn cheapens
such laws, and leads to more individuals being less likely to follow these
laws. 139 This is the Rule of Law Argument, and here, restrictionists can
identify a valid harm.
Restrictionists also have a further valid concern in the Security
Argument. This argument asserts that since aliens who enter the
United States without inspection evade detection and inspection by
immigration authorities, these "illegal" immigrants pose a security and
health risk to the nation.140 This is another plausible concern; without
some form of inspection examining an immigrant's health, security
risks, or criminal history (which most, if not all, U.S. citizens must at
some point face), the national security of the United States is indeed put
at risk.
Yet, the way a certain segment of immigrants has been "illegalized"
obscures two separate classes of "illegal" immigrants in this category:
(1) those inadmissible on the basis of criminal, security, and health
concerns, and (2) those inadmissible because they have no other path of
legal immigration available to them. The former is certainly a valid
concern, and most scholars, lobbies, and policymakers would agree to
keep such laws barring them from admission.
136. See, e.g., Assimilation (2002), FED'N AM. IMMIGR. REFORM,
http://www.fairus.org/issue/Assimilation (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
137. See, e.g., S.B. 1070, 2d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ariz. 2010). Note, however, the recent
revelations about the bill sponsor's likely motivations. See Alia Beard-Rau, ACLU: Pearce
E-Mails Prove SB 1070 Was Racially Motivated, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jul. 19, 2012, 5:56 PM),
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2012/07/19/20120719sb-1070-
pearce-aclu-emails.html.
138. See, e.g., What's Wrong With Illegal Immigration? (2005), FED'N AM. IMMIGR.
REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/issue/whats-wrong-with-illegal-immigration (last visited
Mar. 2, 2013).
139. See id.
140. See Scarborough, supra note 45.
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However, for the latter group, there is no "line" in which the
immigrant can queue; thus, they enter illegally. The would-be migrant
to the United States often has no other recourse than to break such laws
after completing a utility calculus for their current employment
prospects versus their employment and wage prospects in the United
States-even factoring in the negative consequences of breaking
immigration laws and the dangers inherent in traversing a sparse and
treacherous border.
The incentive of the would-be migrant worker to disregard United
States immigration law exists because there is absolutely no efficient,
legal process for low-skill migrants to immigrate to the United States.
Processes exist for highly-skilled workers, 141 those with pre-existing
family ties to U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents, 142 and those
lucky enough to be chosen in the Diversity Visa (DV) program.143
Processes also exist for temporary work in the United States, such as
H-2A and H-2B visas.144 However, these visas do not provide a pathway
to lawful permanent residency and cannot provide a pathway to
citizenship. 145 Thus, those excluded from lawful immigration are
invariably unskilled and poor.
Additionally, other factors tend to make "illegal" immigrants come
from a dissimilar race, culture, and society. The immigrants with the
most to gain come from developing countries, 146 which thanks to
colonialism and-some argue-to today's globalization,147 constitute the
racially, culturally, and socially dissimilar regions of the developing
world. Of course, in the case of the United States, Mexico's geographical
proximity plays a critical role as well. Thus, "illegal" immigrants
invariably constitute low-income, low-skilled workers from a dissimilar
141. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (2006). This provision does allow for unskilled labor
migration; however, a petition for immigration must be accompanied by a labor
certification, stating that no American workers are available to take the job. Id.
Employers are often unwilling to complete this time-consuming and bureaucratic
procedure. At any rate, there is currently a delay of approximately six years for issuance
of visas. See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., Immigrant Numbers for August 2013, IX VISA
BULL. No. 59 (2013), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/visabulletin/visabulletin-augu
st2013.pdf.
142. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a).
143. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c). Of course, residents of North or Central America need not
apply; the DV is available only to natives of countries with relatively low immigration
rates to the United States. See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFF., supra note 141.
144. See 8 U.S.C. § 1011(a)(15)(H).
145. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (requiring five years of lawful permanent resident (i.e.,
green card) status as a prerequisite for U.S. naturalization).
146. See generally Ortega & Peri, supra note 122, at 3.
147. See, e.g., Arie M. Kacowicz, Globalization, Poverty, and the North-South Divide, 9
IN'L STUD. REv. 565, 568 (2007).
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race, culture, and society. They are illegal mainly because of factors
beyond their control, especially when they come, as they often do, from
countries with inadequate educational and employment opportunities.
In sum, the foregoing reveals a few elements of the "illegality" and
Rule of Law Argument that are specious. Rhetoric that tells an
intending immigrant to "get in line!" has no real target or effect;
undoubtedly, many immigrants would "get in line" if a line existed.
Further, if the laws were changed to allow for unchecked low-skill
immigration from dissimilar cultures-thereby removing an
immigrant's "illegality"-restrictionist lobbies would not be placated,
because of their opposition to immigration as a whole.148 Their
arguments for immigration restrictions based on either Rule of Law or
Security concerns would fall apart, assuming an efficient, affordable,
and widely available system of immigration for these low-skill,
low-income laborers, which would scrutinize immigrants for criminal or
security issues.
Thus, we are not really dealing with opposition to "illegal"
immigration as justifying these new state immigration laws; it is
opposition to low-skilled immigration from dissimilar cultures. Such
legislation arises mainly because of fear of unwanted labor
competition, 149 which, as shown above, is not a valid concern.
It is here we see a striking parallel to the justifications underlying
the laws of the First Era of Globalization. As previously discussed,
anti-Chinese laws of that time were justified openly on the basis of
unwanted labor competition and fears of racial and cultural
heterogeneity. Today, we cannot justify what are, in effect,
discriminatory laws on the basis of race or cultural differences without
being kicked out of the public square. Thus, we have "illegalized,"
wittingly or not, the presence of the vast majority of racially and
culturally dissimilar immigrants. This race-neutral term serves to reach
the ends of racial and cultural discrimination, even if laws based on this
concept are not justified squarely on such a basis.
"Illegalization" serves racially and culturally discriminatory ends by
inculcating natives with a predisposition against "illegal" immigrants,
using the Rule of Law and Security arguments to obscure the difference
between criminal and security-based "illegal" immigrants and those for
148. See FED'N AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, supra note 50.
149. Either unwanted as to one's own labor market, or, as implied by Hainmueller and
Hiscox, opposition to competition in the national labor market, irrespective of direct
competition from immigrants in a native's labor market. See Hainmueller & Hiscox, supra
note 123.
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whom no path of immigration exists.150 "Illegal" immigrants are
normatively seen as bad.
Then, since the conception of "illegal" immigrants happens to apply
to racially, culturally, and societally dissimilar immigrants, due to the
factors identified above, laws against illegal immigration cannot escape
the racist castigations that immigration proponents levy against
restrictionist laws, lobbies, and legislators. In the minds of many,
including the media and immigrants themselves, 151 these are race-based
immigration laws. It also seems that in the minds of some prominent
legislators, racism motivated their promotion of this legislation. 152
Indeed, Critical Race Theory scholars suggest that such laws are often
passed because of underlying racial sentiments; some would argue that
the entirety of the immigration regime in the United States exists to
codify a racially disparate "other" as "alien," thereby legitimizing
disparate, harmful, and at times "inhumane" treatment of that
"other."153 At the end of the day, we are left with laws that enforce an
effectively racially based exclusionary policy, couched in the politically
palatable language of "illegalized" immigration, that have the very same
effect as the anti-Chinese laws of the First Era of Globalization.
IV. CONCLUSION: RETHINKING IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN A GLOBAL
WORLD
Given that these restrictionist arguments have been disarmed, what
stands in the way of a completely open migration policy? Again, quite an
150. Entirely left out of the "illegal" immigrant concept are violators of immigration
laws with violations not related to entry. Examples of this could include the German
student who overstayed her F-1 Visa, or her husband on an F-2 status who worked in a
restaurant without authorization. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i), (ii) (authorizing
nonimmigrant status for aliens attending university in the United States); 1227(a)(1)(C)(i)
(authorizing removal of aliens who fail to comply with the conditions of their
nonimmigrant status); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(5)(i), (iv) (establishing various time limits for
F-1 status holders); (f)(15)(i) (establishing acceptance of employment as a violation of F-2
status). Though these are "illegal" immigrants insofar as they have violated federal
immigration law-and are thus the subjects of federal and state laws on the topic-they
are not included in the common conception of "illegal" immigrants.
151. See, e.g., Massimo Calabresi, Is Racism Fueling the Immigration Debate?, TIME
(May 17, 2006), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1195250,00.html.
152. See, e.g., Beard-Rau, supra note 137.
153. See Mary Romero, Crossing the Immigration and Race Border: A Critical Race
Theory Approach to Immigration Studies, 11 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 23, 28 (2008)
(cataloging scholarly work on race-and-immigration issues, including Kevin R. Johnson,
'Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of
Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263 (1996)).
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important point: "people are not bananas."154 Whether racial, cultural,
and social integration is a good thing is a wholly separate question from
how these issues are avoided 55 by modern restrictionist advocates.
What this note has attempted to bring out of the literature, law, and
policy discussions, through a comparison with the laws in the First Era
of Globalization, is the legislature's effective obscuring of this type of
discussion. The blatantly racist and discriminatory laws against
Chinese immigrants were eventually repealed. Repeal was
accomplished on the basis of a (mostly) national consensus against
racial discrimination.1 56 Now that our laws cannot draw such
discriminatory lines or be justified on such bases, the question is
twofold: (1) can the American public recognize that these laws subtly
discriminate along racial lines, and (2) are they willing to have the
discussion on whether racially, culturally, and socially dissimilar
individuals ought to be allowed to migrate to the United States? This
note argues that the public must recognize the subtleties of U.S.
immigration laws-as this piece has demonstrated-and they must be
willing to have a discussion of the latter. Otherwise, the public does not
really know what effect its laws are having, and laws made in the mold
of "illegality"-like those in Arizona, Alabama, and elsewhere-will
continue to pop up with highly damaging effects to immigrants, natives,
and a unified national immigration policy.
One final point on globalization's role: the incentives of globalization
are not going away. With the current level of technology and deep
integration of the world economy, immigration laws that seek to keep
the "other" out serve only to run against the grain of an inevitable
economic, social, political, and cultural integration process. Laws such
as those in Alabama and Arizona-even if they succeeded in reversing
globalization's integrating effects-will only be a temporary reprieve
against the forces of globalization, or else serve to isolate a nation or
state from what will continue to be a dominating force. Given that free
immigration increases gross world product, 15 7 and is itself the final
expression of a globalized world, restrictionist advocates are hurting
businesses, immigrants, natives, and nations alike, and are engaging in
a fruitless effort against a relentless process.
154. See Gordon, supra note 135.
155. Mostly. See Beard-Rau, supra note 137.
156. Though the Magnuson Act repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943, ethnic
Chinese could not own property in many states until 1965-after the passage of the Civil
Rights Act and the current Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. See JAPANESE AM.
CITIZENS LEAGUE, AN UNNOTICED STRUGGLE: A CONCISE HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICAN
CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES 10 (2008), available at http://www.jacl.org/public-policy/documents/
An%20Unnoticed%20Struggle.pdf.
157. See Clemens, supra note 127, at 89.

